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Lawrence Schembri 
The ability of domestic firms to compete with foreign firms in domestic and 
foreign markets is greatly influenced by  the relative price of  domestic- and 
foreign-produced goods.  This relative price is, in part,  determined by  the 
level of  the exchange rate.  Under purchasing power parity  (PPP), relative 
prices should change in proportion to any exchange rate movement. However, 
since 1980, the U.S. dollar has appreciated and then depreciated by  roughly 
50 percent vis-a-vis the Japanese yen and the West German mark, while the 
prices of many traded goods exported to the United States have moved much 
less.  As  a result,  U.S.  import prices expressed in  foreign currency have 
moved sharply relative to foreign exporters’ domestic prices. This failure of 
foreign-produced traded goods prices to respond to exchange rate changes has 
had a significant effect on the international competitiveness of U.S. firms. 
Recently, several studies (most notably Krugman  1987; Dornbusch 1987; 
and  Giovannini  1988)  have  tried  to  explain  this  “pricing  to  market” 
phenomenon by appealing to various theories of imperfect competition.’ Both 
Krugman (1987) and Giovannini (1988) note that a complete explanation must 
include  two  elements.  First,  the  exporting  firm  must  be  able  to  price 
discriminate across markets (i.e., it must face different elasticities of demand 
across markets,  and  arbitrage across  markets must  be  less than  perfect). 
Second, the firm must incur dynamic costs of adjustment on the supply side 
Lawrence  Schembri  is  assistant  professor  in  the  Department  of  Economics  at  Carleton 
University, Ottawa. 
The author would like to thank John Baldwin, Albert0 Giovannini, Robert Feenstra, Catherine 
Momson, and Thomas Rymes for helpful advice, Paul Reed,  Peter Koumanakos,  Jean Leger, 
Barb Slater, and Danny Triandafillou for encouraging this research, and John McVey and his staff 
in  the  Business  Microdata  Integration  and  Analysis  Section,  Statistics  Canada,  for  their 
cooperation.  Generous support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada and Statistics Canada is gratefully acknowledged.  The responsibility for the thoughts 
expressed in this paper and any errors therein rest solely with the author. 
185 186  Lawrence Schembri 
(and also perhaps on the demand side [see Krugman  1987; and Froot and 
Klemperer 19881) that affect the exporting firm’s reaction to an exchange rate 
change. In general, the firm’s reaction to an exchange rate change that alters 
foreign  demand  conditions  will  depend  on  the  expected  magnitude  and 
permanence  of  the  change.  That is,  a large exchange rate  change that  is 
perceived  as being  permanent  may  cause the  exporting  firm  to  adjust its 
export  price  expressed  in  foreign  currency  and  expand  or  contract  its 
productive capacity and its foreign sales and distribution networks. However, 
if the change is perceived as being temporary, the firm’s reaction will be much 
more muted in that it will probably maintain export prices and quantities at 
relatively constant levels and absorb the exchange rate change in its profit 
margin. 
Most of  the empirical work  that has been done on this issue consists of 
either  simple comparisons of  domestic and  imported  goods prices  in  the 
aggregate  or  by  sectors  (see,  e.g.,  Mann  1986;  Dornbusch  1987;  and 
Krugman  1987) or  the  estimation  of  pass-through  equations  (see,  e.g., 
Feinberg 1987; and Feenstra  1987). This evidence clearly demonstrates the 
existence of  the pricing to market phenomenon, especially in differentiated 
goods markets. Hence, while this evidence has limited explanatory power, it 
does indicate that pricing to market seems to occur in markets where firms are 
likely to be able to set different prices. 
Giovannini (1  988) estimates a nonstructural time-series model to explain 
deviations from PPP for selected categories of Japanese export goods to the 
United States. While he finds that deviations from PPP are forecastable, he 
cannot consistently distinguish between the two possible explanations of this 
occurrence,  ex  ante  price  discrimination  or  exchange  rate  surprises  in 
conjunction with long-term price setting. Furthermore,  although his model 
has the appearance of  being dynamic because firms maximize the expected 
present discounted value of profits, it is essentially static; dynamic costs of 
adjustment are not modeled. 
Knetter (1989) estimates an export-pricing equation for selected U.S. and 
German export  goods to determine whether firms in  the domestic export 
industry price discriminate across markets in different countries. He uses a 
panel data set consisting of export prices over time and across markets that 
allows him to control for shifts in  the marginal cost of  production that are 
unobservable  but  common  to  all  markets  and  to  isolate  discriminatory 
country-specific effects. These effects arise in part because of movements in 
bilateral exchange rates that affect the elasticity of demand in export markets. 
These country-specific exchange rate  effects are found to  be  significantly 
different across markets, indicating that price discrimination is being prac- 
ticed. The simplicity of the model precludes a structural interpretation of the 
effect of exchange rate changes on export prices. 
The purpose of this paper is to build a structural model of an export industry 
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change on domestic prices, export prices, and industrial activity and to test 
directly for differences in  the price elasticities of  demand  across markets. 
While the model employed in  the paper is  static,  which  implies that  any 
exchange rate change is expected to be permanent, it is still possible to obtain 
meaningful estimates of the elasticities of demand and to determine how the 
exchange rate changes that did occur affected markups (the price-marginal 
cost  differential)  in  the  domestic  and  export  markets.  Furthermore,  this 
structural model  provides  a  framework  that  can  be  extended  to  include 
dynamic costs of  adjustment. 
The model described in this paper is an extension of the closed-economy 
industry model of  Applebaum (1979). Since the theoretical model  is  of  a 
single export industry, it is necessarily partial equilibrium in nature. However, 
its usefulness derives from the fact that both the demand and the supply side 
of  the industry are explicitly modeled. 
The empirical version of the model is estimated using a carefully collected 
data set on a major Canadian export industry.2 This export industry produces 
almost exclusively for sales in the Canadian and  U.S.  markets. More than 
three-quarters of  the output of  the industry is exported, and its sales to the 
United States account for more than half of U.S. consumption. The output of 
this industry is a relatively homogeneous commodity so that high-quality price 
data are available on domestic and  export  sales. Therefore,  this Canadian 
industry provides a good case study for the empirical implementation of the 
theoretical model and the test of different price elasticities of demand. 
In figure 6.1, the percentage difference between the U.S. export price and 
the Canadian domestic price (both prices expressed in Canadian dollars) is 
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Fig. 6.1  The U.S. expodCanadian domestic price differential and the 
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plotted along with the Canadian exchange rate ($Canadian/U.S .$) over the 
years  1973-85.  It is important to note that, whenever the Canadian dollar 
depreciated (e.g., 1976-79  and 1983-85),  the export/domestic price differ- 
ential increased sharply. Indeed, the U.S. export price was significantly above 
the Canadian price for most of  this period. Hence, it appears that Canadian 
exporters were pricing to market as they tried to maintain the local prices of 
their goods in the face of sizable exchange rate movements. 
6.1  Theoretical Framework 
The  theoretical  model  is  of  an  industry  in  the  domestic  country  that 
produces  an  intermediate  good  that  is primarily  exported  but  is also  sold 
domestically.  To  develop the  structure  of  the  model,  consider the  export 
industry as a single firm, a monopolist, that sells in two markets, domestic and 
foreign or export. The monopolist’s technology is defined by the production 
function F, where yo = F(z)  is the output of the intermediate good produced 
by  an n-dimensional  vector of  inputs z  and F  is a continuous-from-above, 
nondecreasing,  and  quasi-concave  function.  In  addition,  assume that  the 
intermediate  good, yo, is consumed as an  input by  two  sets of  firms that 
operate  in  a  final  goods  industry  in  the  domestic  and  foreign  countries. 
Therefore, yo  = y1  + y,,  where y,  and y2 denote domestic and  foreign 
consumption of  the intermediate good, respectively. 
Each firm in the domestic final goods industry has a production function 
defined by  GI, where xl0 = G,(y,, x,) is the output produced and xI is an 
m-dimensional vector of inputs other than y,  used in the production process. 
Similarly,  each  firm  in  the  foreign  final goods  industry  has  a  production 
function defined by  G,,  where  = G,(y2,  x,)  is the output and x2 is the 
m-vector of other inputs. If the firm production functions at home and abroad, 
G, and G,,  are subject to constant returns to scale (in addition to being quasi 
concave and nondecreasing) and all firms in the final goods industry in each 
country face the same prices and act competitively, then GI and G2 can be 
interpreted as the industry production functions for the two sets of firms that 
employ yo as a productive input. 
Let the prices of y,, y,,  and z  in domestic currency be pl,  p2, and q, the 
prices of xl0  and x, in domestic currency be wl0 and w,, and the prices of x,~ 
and x2 in foreign currence be wlo and wl  (asterisks denote value in foreign 
~urrency).~ 
If  domestic  and  foreign firms in  the  final goods  industry  competitively 
maximize profits, then profit functions for the domestic and foreign industries, 
J, and  J2, can  be  defined  as  the  solutions  to  the  following  problems- 
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where e is the exchange rate defined as the foreign currency price of domestic 
currency. 
At this point, two important issues should be noted. First, since the model 
is partial equilibrium and the exchange rate is a macroeconomic variable, then 
e can be treated in the model as an exogenous variable. Second, the exchange 
rate is assumed to affect only the foreign currency price of the export good. 
For simplicity, the possible effects of the exchange rate on other input prices 
are ign~red.~ 
Assuming  that the profit functions defined  in (1)  and  (2) have the usual 
regularity  properties (see Varian 1978) and are differentiable with respect to 
the input prices, the optimal demand functions for the intermediate good, y, 
and y2, and for the other inputs, x, and x2, are given by Hotelling’s lemma as 




-y2  = aJ2(ep2,  wto, wT)8ep2 = H2(ep2,  wT0, wT), 
-x2  = VW5J2(ep2,  wto, w%). 
Equations (3) and (5) represent the domestic and foreign demand functions 
for the intermediate good that the monopolist faces, and they can be inserted 
into the monopolist’s profit maximization problem,  which is given by: 
(7)  max  [plyI + p2y2 -  qTz:  y1 + y2 = F(z), 
P,.P?’-?I.VZ 
-yl  = HI(pl,  wIo,  wl), -y2  = H2(ep2,  wto, wT)1 
or 
or 
(9)  max{ -plHl(pl,  wIo, wI) -  p2ff2(ep2,  wTo,  wti 
PI.& 
- crq, -HI(.) - H2(.)1:  PI9 P2 3  o>, 
where C(q,  yo) = min,[qrz:F(z)  = yo] is the cost function that is the dual to 
the  monopolist’s production  function F.  Note  that having the  cost function 
depend on total output, yo, rather than on y,  and y2 separately implies that the 190  Lawrence Schembri 
cost associated with producing and selling a unit of the monopolist’s output to 
domestic  and  foreign  buyers  is  the  same.6 It  is  assumed  as well  that  the 
monopolist is a price taker in markets for the inputs denoted by z and that the 
cost function has the usual regularity properties (see Varian 1978). However, 
it need not be assumed that the cost (production) functions of the monopolist 
exhibit constant returns to scale. 
The  monopolist’s  demand  for  inputs  conditional  on  output  yo can  be 
obtained by applying Shepherd’s lemma and differentiating the cost function 
with respect to input prices: 
If the demand functions for the intermediate good given by H, and H,  and 
the cost function are differentiable with respect to p1  and p2  and yo, then the 
first-order conditions for the monopolist’s profit maximization problem in (9) 
are 
Equations  (1  1)  and  (12)  can  be  interpreted  simply  as the  condition  that 
marginal revenue be equated across the two markets to the marginal cost of 
production. 
Equations (1  I) and (12) can be rewritten as 
and 
(14)  P2  = y,(ep,, wto, wl) +  yo)/ayo. 
Hence, the monopolist’s selling prices in the two markets equal the marginal 
cost  of  production  plus  market-specific  markups,  which  are  defined  as 
follows: 
(15)  YI(PI7 WIO,  WII =  -H,(p,, WIO,  w,V[aH,  (PI9 WlOI  Wl)l%%l 
=  -[aJl(Pl,  WIO,  wl)~~pll~[~2Jl(Pl,  WIO,  Wl)laP:l1 
(16)  ~2k~2,  w40, wt) = -H2(ep2,  wt0, wT)4eaH2(ep2, wTo, wW3ep21 
= -  [dJ,(ep,,  wTow t  )/aep,ll[ea2J2  (ep,, wlo, ~l  )/dkp2  )*I. 
The model derived so far represents a complete partial equilibrium model 
of the demand and supply of the intermediate good yo. If functional forms are 
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collected on  the  variables p,,  p,,  e, wl0, wl,  wl0, and  w:,  then  several 
interesting empirical results can be obtained. 
First, estimates of  the values of y, and y2  can be determined. In addition, 
an estimate of the inverse elasticity of  demand for yo in each market can be 
obtained from the expressions E, = y,/p,  and E? =  y2/p2.  If y,  = y2 = 0, 
that is, the markups are zero, then the monopolist is a price taker in his two 
output markets since the elasticities of  demand are infinite. If  y1 and y2 are 
estimated to be  greater than  zero and  different, then the monopolist faces 
different elasticities of demand in the two markets since different markups are 
being applied to the same marginal cost of  production. 
Second, the effect of an exchange rate change on the domestic and foreign 
(export) prices, p, and p2, the  level of  output,  yo, and  the  monopolist’s 
demand for inputs can be estimated.’ Theoretically the effect of the exchange 
rate change can be determined by  totally differentiating (13) and  (14) with 
respect to the exchange rate to obtain (for a complete derivation,  see the 
Appendix): 
and 
The second derivative of  the cost function  with  respect to  output can be 
negative, positive, or zero, depending on whether the monopolist’s technol- 
ogy exhibits increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to scale. The second 
derivative of the profit functions J,  and J, and ID1  are unambiguously positive 
in sign while B,, is likely to be positive and B,,  negative (for more details, 
see the Appendix). Therefore, the derivatives in (17) and (18) will probably 
be  negative  if  marginal  costs are increasing so that  a depreciation of  the 
exporter’s currency,  a fall in  e, will raise the domestic and export prices 
(expressed in domestic currency) of the intermediate good. 
The effect of  an exchange rate change on the export price expressed in 
foreign currency is given by: 
dP2 
-  =p2  + e-. 
de  de 
deP2 
The sign of  this expression is less obvious than the sign of  (18). It  is more 
likely to  be positive.* 
Furthermore, the effect of  an exchange rate change on the monopolist’s 
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and the effects on the monopolist’s input demands are given by: 
Since  theory  in  the  form  of  regularity  conditions  and  second-order 
conditions for profit maximization cannot unambiguously determine the signs 
of  the  expressions in (17)  and  (18),  the  door  is  left  open  for  empirical 
estimation to help resolve the issue. Moreover, while the best that theory can 
do is to determine the signs of  the effects of an exchange rate change on the 
endogenous  variables,  empirical  work  can  provide  an  estimate  of  the 
magnitude of the effect. Therefore, it is now  time to implement the model 
empirically in order to provide further answers. 
6.2  Empirical Implementation 
The first  step in  implementing the  theoretical  model  for the  purpose  of 
empirical estimation is to specify functional  forms for the monopolist’s cost 
function and for the profit functions of the consuming industries at home and 
abroad. These functional forms should be flexible in that they should provide 
second-order Taylor approximations to any arbitrary functions that satisfy the 
regularity properties. In addition, the functional forms for the profit functions 
should yield simple expressions for the markup terms yl and y2. 
Another consideration in specifying the functional forms is the time horizon 
of the analysis. So far it has been assumed that an exchange rate change does 
not affect input prices. This assumption is reasonable only if the time horizon 
of the analysis is relatively short. Therefore, the theoretical model developed 
earlier that treats all inputs to the production process as variable (which is true 
only in the long run) needs to be modified to reflect the shorter time horizon 
of the empirical analysis. This could be accomplished by  treating the capital 
stock  (the nth  input)  as  a quasi-fixed  factor so that  the  monopolist’s  cost 
function would become a variable cost function and the profit functions of the 
consuming industries would be restricted or short-run profit functions. While 
making  the resulting  empirical model more realistic, this modification  does 
not significantly affect the results derived from the theoretical model. 
Given these considerations, the normalized quadratic was chosen from the 
set of popular flexible functional forms, which also includes the generalized 193  Export Prices and Exchange Rates 
Leontief and the translog.'  Therefore, the monopolist's variable cost function 
i=2  i=2 
where a, = ajJ  and the superscript r denotes normalized. That is, Cr = C/q,, 
and q; = ql/ql,  where C is total variable cost and q, is the factor price used 
to normalize the function. Note that constant returns to scale is not imposed 
on the function, but linear homogeneity of the function in prices is obtained 
by the normalization. Moreover, this restriction is not nested and thus is not 
testable.  lo 
Similarly, the  restricted  normalized profit  functions for  the  consuming 
industries are defined as 
i=2 
i=2  1 
and 
r=2 
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where d,  = d,,,  f, = A,, J; = J,/w,,,  and .&  = J2/w;].  Treating the quasi- 
fixed capital stock as a multiplicative factor imposes constant returns to scale 
on these functions. 
To  actually estimate  the  model,  firm-level  data on  this  Canadian  export 
industry  are employed  along  with  industry-level  data on the Canadian  and 
U.S. final goods industries. I’ It is assumed that three variable inputs-labor, 
materials, and energy-are  used in the production of  the intermediate good, 
and this good, labor, and energy are employed as variable inputs into the final 
goods industries. 
To  implement  the  theoretical  model  for  the  Canadian  export  industry 
empirically, data on a set of firms rather than on a single monopolist firm are 
used.  Although  the  Canadian  export industry  is  fairly concentrated  with  a 
four-firm concentration ratio of  approximately 50 percent, it is not reasonable 
to assume that the firms in the industry collude to mimic  the behavior of  a 
monopolist. Therefore, it would be incorrect simply to sum the data for each 
firm and treat the aggregate as a single monopolistic firm. Instead, each firm 
is  assumed to  face similar output  market  conditions  and employ  the  same 
production  technology.  While the firms are assumed to act competitively in 
factor markets, the amount of each variable input used in production depends 
on firm-specific input prices. 
Furthermore, the objective of the empirical model is to test not whether the 
demand curves facing the entire industry are horizontal but whether individual 
firms set prices above the shadow price of production,  which is the marginal 
variable cost of the last unit of output produced. If each firm  is identical and 
acts as a perfect competitor, then prices should be equal to the shadow price 
of  production  regardless  of  the  slope  of  the  industry  demand  curves. 
Therefore, since the model focuses on the pricing decision at the firm level, 
it does provide a valid test of price-taking behavior across markets. l2 
Using the functional forms specified  for the variable cost function  of  the 
Canadian export industry and for the variable profit functions of the Canadian 
and U.S. final goods industries+quations  (22)-(24)-the  empirical model 
corresponding  to  equations  (lo), (13), and  (14) can be  derived.  For  each 
function,  the  wage  rate  in  the  corresponding  industry  is  chosen  as  the 
normalizing  price.  By applying  Shepherd’s lemma to the cost function,  the 
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Note that the estimated demand function for labor can be derived as a residual 
from the other two functions. That is, 
ZL  = (C/q,) -  [(4€4L)ZE +  (qMh,)ZMl. 
Using (15),  (16), (23), and (24), the expressions for the markup terms are 
given by 
KI[dp + dPp(Pi/wiL)  + dp,,(widw~~)  + dpAw~€/wiL)I 
(27)  TI = - 
Kl [dppl 
and 
+ a&  + UV&M  + a,€%  + ayyY0qL + ayKK,qL . 
Note that the relative price terms with a coefficient of  one are moved to the 
left-hand side of  each equation. 
In addition, the two demand equations given by H,  and H, in the theoretical 
model can be derived from the profit functions by applying Hotelling’s lemma 
to obtain 
(32)  yllK1  =  -dp -  dpP(Pl/wiJ -  dpW(w1dw1L) - dp.~(w~dwIL) 
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where the expression on the left-hand side of each equation is demand per unit 
of capital. The inclusion of these two equations in the empirical model permits 
the identification of the key parameters dpp  and f,,.  The identity yo  y, + y2 
is also included in the empirical model. 
The final step in implementing  the  model for estimation  is  to embed the 
empirical model in a stochastic framework by adding mean-zero error terms 
to equations  (25),  (26), (30), (31), (32), and  (33) to  capture optimization 
errors. 
6.3  Data 
All the data employed in estimating the model are annual and taken from 
the  period  1973-85  (thirteen  years).  Data  prior  to  1973 were  not  readily 
available on a consistent basis. 
The data on the Canadian export industry were taken from the Census of 
Manufacturers data base. A consistent series of establishments that primarily 
produce  the  intermediate  good  was collected.  The establishment-level  data 
were aggregated to the firm level so that data on  outputs and inputs are for 
sixteen firms that account for 90-95  percent of the industry’s shipments of the 
intermediate good. Labor data are the  number of  hours worked  and  wages 
paid for production and related workers. Data on materials consist of quantity 
and  price  Divisia  indexes  for several  components. Energy  data  consist  of 
quantity  and  price  Divisia indexes  for coal, natural  gas, gasoline,  fuel oil, 
liquid petroleum gases, and electricity used. 
Capital  stock  series  at  the  firm  level  were  constructed  using  the  data 
collected from the annual capital expenditures survey conducted by Statistics 
Canada.I3 The capital stock data are midyear net stocks in constant dollars. 
Output is the sum of shipments in tons of the intermediate good and other 
related products. Establishments in the sample were selected on the basis that 
intermediate good of interest accounted for at least three-quarters of their total 
shipments. 
Separate  series  are  collected  by  Statistics  Canada  on  prices  of  the 
intermediate  good  for  domestic  and  export  sales.I4  The  prices  of  the 
intermediate good are f.0.b. (freight on board) plant and, therefore, net of any 
transport costs. U.S.  data on quantity and value of imports of the intermediate 
good from Canada provide  an alternate  source of export price  data.  These 
prices are also net of  transport costs.‘5 
Consistent data series for the Canadian final goods industry were obtained 
for wages,  industry selling prices,  energy input prices,  and capital stock. In 
particular,  data  used  to  construct  a  wage  rate  for production  and  related 197  Export Prices and  Exchange Rates 
workers and an energy input price index (a Divisia index formed from natural 
gas,  gasoline,  fuel  oil,  and  electricity)  were  taken  from  the  Census  of 
Manufacturers.  Capital  stock data are midyear  net  stocks in constant  197  1 
dollars  obtained  in  unpublished  form  from  the  Science,  Technology  and 
Capital Stock Division, Statistics Canada. The industry selling price index is 
the ratio of value added in current dollars to value added in constant dollars. 
For the U.  S. final goods industry, a wage rate series and energy price index 
series were taken from the Annual  Survey of  Manufacturing.  The industry 
selling price series was taken from the U.S. Commerce Department publica- 
tion  US.  Industrial  Outlook. Capital  stock data are  midyear  net  stocks in 
constant 1972 dollars obtained in unpublished form from the U.S. Commerce 
Department. 
The  exchange rate  is  the  average  noon  spot  rate  in  U.S.  dollars  per 
Canadian dollar. 
All the data used in estimation were scaled to take the value of one at the 
sample mean. 
6.4  Estimation and Results 
The empirical model represented by equations (25), (26), and (30)-(33)  is 
a simultaneous  system  with  six endogenous variables-input  demands, z, 
and zE, intermediate good prices, p1  and p2,  and intermediate good sales, y, 
and y2. To estimate this system efficiently so as to impose the across-equation 
restrictions  and  allow  for  contemporaneous  correlation  of  the  disturbances 
across  equations,  a full-information,  maximum  likelihood  estimation  tech- 
nique  was tried.  Unfortunately,  the nonlinear optimization routine failed to 
converge  despite  repeated  attempts.  Given  the  size of  the  system  with 
twenty-one  unknown  parameters  and  the  limited  number  of  time-series 
observations on the Canadian and U.S. consuming industries (thirteen years), 
this failure is not surprising. 
In an effort to limit the number of parameters to be estimated at one time 
and to keep the system as linear as possible,  it was decided to estimate the 
empirical model in two steps. First, equations (25), (26), (30), and (31) were 
estimated  simultaneously using iterated three-stage least squares. l6 Second, 
equations  (32)  and  (33)  were  jointly  estimated  using  Zellner’s  (1962) 
seemingly unrelated regression technique. 
Initially,  all the across-equation  restrictions  were  imposed when the  first 
four equations were estimated.  These restrictions were strongly rejected  by 
the data using a modified F-test statistic. In particular, the restrictions between 
the  first  and  the  second  pairs  of  equations  appeared  to  be  the  ones  most 
inconsistent  with  the  data. Therefore, these restrictions  were  dropped,  and 
only the symmetry restriction between the first two input demand equations 198  Lawrence Schembri 
and the restrictions  on the equivalence of  marginal  cost across the last two 
markup equations were maintained. 
The results from this estimation are given in table 6.1. In the input demand 
equations,  the coefficients on the own price terms are significantly negative. 
From these estimates, the cost function is found to be concave in prices at all 
points in the sample. The coefficient on output is significantly positive in both 
equations,  and the symmetry restriction  on the cross-price  variable  is not 
rejected by the data at the  1 percent  level. In  addition, the relatively  large 
values  for the Durbin-Watson  statistic  provide  no evidence of  model  mis- 
specification. 
The results for the markup equations are less satisfactory. While many of 
the estimated coefficients are statistically  significant,  the low-value Durbin- 
Watson statistics for both equations indicate  serial correlation  of the distur- 
bances and possible model misspecification. The restrictions that the marginal 
cost parameters  be the same across the two equations is not rejected at the  1 
percent level. However, they are rejected at the 5 percent level, again perhaps 
indicating some misspecification of  the model. The estimated coefficient uyy 
is positive, which implies that the estimated marginal variable cost function is 
upward sloping. 
It should be noted that, because the complete empirical model is not being 
estimated, the parameters dpp  and fpp  cannot be identified in the first step of 
the estimation procedure. Nevertheless, it is still possible to obtain estimates 
of the markup terms y1  and y2. These are given in table 6.2, along with the 
estimated inverse elasticities of  demand. 
Table 6.1  Estimation Results 1:  Equations (1)-(4) 
Coefficient  Estimate  Standard Error 
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Table 6.1  (continued) 
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Note:  Estimation technique is iterated three-stage least squares. Estimation period is 1973-85. 
Number  of  observations  is  208.  R2’s  are  for  the  whole  four-equation  system.  Statistical 
significance is based on asymptotic r-ratios: *** at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; 
and * at the 10 percent level. While the stacked data set consists of  206 observations (thirteen 
years times sixteen firms), the number of  distinct observations on the final goods industries in 
Canada and the United States is thirteen. 
aDependent variable is znn 
bDependent variable is z,. 
‘Dependent  variable is pl(l + I/w,~), 
dDependent variable is pz(  1  + Ilwk). 
The estimated markups are found to be significantly greater than zero at the 
1 percent level in both markets in each year of the sample. More interestingly, 
the markup on U.S.  sales tended to increase over the sample period. This 
reflects the fact that export prices rose at a faster rate (10.7 percent per annum 
on the average) than wage rates (10.1 percent) and unit materials costs (9.1 
percent). These two components represent 80-85  percent of  variable costs in 
any  given  year.  Only  unit  energy  costs  increased  at  a  faster  rate  (13.2 
percent). Markups in both markets fell in the oil price shock years of 1974 and 
1979,  when  unit  energy  costs  jumped  by  29  percent  and  18  percent, 
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Table 6.2  Estimated Markups and Inverse Elasticities of Demand 
Markups 
Inverse Elasticities 
Canada  United States  of Demand 
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,262  ,084 
,280  .08  I 
,294  ,089 
,312  ,094 
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,504  ,105 
.638  .lo4 
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.529  .I11 





























Note:  The markup represents the difference between price and estimated marginal variable cost. 
It can be interpreted as a percentage only at the sample mean. 
The markup on U.S. export sales is greater than the markup on Canadian 
sales in every year, although this difference is significant only at the 5 percent 
level  in  the  years  1976,  1978,  1980,  and  1983-85.  In  particular,  the 
difference in markups is relatively large in the years after  1976, when the 
Canadian dollar depreciated almost continuously against the U.S. dollar. It is 
clear that during these years firms did not pass the lower value of the Canadian 
dollar into lower U.S. dollar export prices. They absorbed the exchange rate 
movement into their profit margins by  pricing to market. 
Evaluated at the sample mean, both markups are significantly greater than 
zero, and the U.S. markup is significantly greater than the Canadian markup 
at the 10 percent level. This supports the hypothesis that Canadian firms had 
the ability to price discriminate across the two markets. 
Also, the fact that the inverse elasticities of demand lie between zero and 
one in  both  markets  at  all  points  in  the  sample is  consistent with  profit- 
maximizing behavior. Firms with market power are always on the elastic part 
of  the demand curve. 
In order to estimate the effect of an exchange rate change on the prices of 
the intermediate good for domestic and export sales and on output and input 
demands in the Canadian export industry, it is necessary to obtain estimates 
of  the parameters dPp  and f,.  They represent the second-order derivatives of 
the profit functions, J, and J,,  with respect to the price of  the intermediate 
good. As these parameters are not identified in the first step of the estimation 201  Export Prices and Exchange Rates 
procedure, which involved the first four equations in the empirical model, the 
demand equations  for  the  intermediate good,  (32) and  (33), need  to  be 
estimated. 
The results obtained by  applying seemingly unrelated regression to these 
two equations are given in table 6.3. Owing to the small number of degrees 
of  freedom  (nine),  accurate  estimates of  the  coefficients in  the  demand 
equations could not be obtained; most of the coefficients are not statistically 
significant. In particular, the estimates of  the coefficients dpp and fpp,  while 
having the theoretically correct positive sign, are not significantly different 
from  zero.  The  Durbin-Watson  statistics for  both  equations are  in  the 
inconclusive range. 
Employing these estimates for dpp  and fpp along with  earlier estimates, 
equations (17) and (18) can be evaluated at the sample mean to determine the 
elasticities of the domestic and export intermediate good prices with respect 
to an exchange rate change. The estimated elasticity of the domestic price, p,, 
with respect to the exchange rate is -0.22 percent, while estimated elasticity 
for the export price, p2,  is  -0.85  percent. Hence, a 1 percent depreciation 
(appreciation) of  the Canadian dollar against the U.S.  dollar will cause the 
domestic price of the intermediate good to rise (fall) by  0.22 percent, while 
the export price will rise (fall) by  0.85 percent. Under the same circum- 
Table 6.3  Estimation Results 2: Equations (5) and (6) 

















-  .975* 
.084 
,015 




-  1.192*** 
,465 













Note:  Estimation technique is seemingly unrelated regression.  Estimation period  is  1973-85. 
Number of observations is thirteen. The R2’s are for the whole two-equation system. Statistical 
significance based on asymptotic ?-ratios: *** at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and 
* at the 10 percent level. 
“Dependent variable is y,/K,. 
bDependent variable is y,/K,. 202  Lawrence Schembri 
stances, the U.S. dollar export price will fall (rise) by 0.15 percent. Thus, the 
U.S. dollar price is not very responsive to an exchange rate change. 
Using equation (20), the elasticity of the level of output with respect to the 
exchange rate change is computed to be -0.051  percent at the sample mean. 
Hence, a  1 percent depreciation (appreciation) of  the Canadian dollar will 
cause  output  of  the  intermediate  good  to  rise  (fall)  by  0.051  percent. 
Therefore, the changes in sales in the domestic and U.S. markets partially 
offset each other, resulting in a relatively small effect on output. 
The  effect  of  an  exchange  rate  change  on  demand  for  inputs  by  the 
Canadian export industry can also be determined by using equation (21) and 
the regressions results in table 6.1. The elasticity of the demand for materials 
and energy with respect to the exchange rate computed at the sample mean are 
-0.038  and  -0.055,  respectively.” 
Standard errors for the point estimates of the effects of  an exchange rate 
change are difficult to determine. However, given that the estimates of dpp  and 
f,  are known to be inaccurate, it is likely that the standard errors would be 
relatively large. Hence, while these point estimates do provide some insight 
as to the effect of  an exchange rate change, they are not likely to be very 
robust. 
6.5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, a partial equilibrium model of the supply and demand of an 
exportable  intermediate good  is  theoretically constructed  and  empirically 
estimated. The objective of this exercise is to develop a framework in which 
the effect of an exchange rate change on the industry could be determined so 
that the recently observed pricing to market behavior of foreign exporters to 
the United States could be studied. While the model developed in this paper 
is static, it was still possible to determine whether the export industry being 
analyzed price discriminates between its domestic and its export markets. 
In the case of the major Canadian export industry considered in this paper, 
price  markups  over  estimated  marginal  variable  cost  are  found  to  be 
statistically greater than zero on sales in both the U.S. export market and the 
Canadian  domestic market.  In  addition,  the  markups  on U.S. sales were 
significantly greater than  those on Canadian sales for several years in  the 
sample and at the sample mean. This difference in markups tended to increase 
as the Canadian exchange rate depreciated. Hence, firms in this industry were 
able  to  price  discriminate between  the  two  markets,  and  exchange  rate 
changes to a large extent were not passed through into U.S. dollar export 
prices but were absorbed into the firms’ profit margins. 
Since firms in the industry possess some degree of  market power in each 
market and marginal costs are not constant, exchange rate changes would not 
result in one-for-one changes in prices. A 1 percent exchange rate deprecia- 
tion is estimated to cause a 0.22 percent increase in the domestic ($Canadian) 
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Although the empirical results provide some support for the model and 
indicate the existence of  pricing to market behavior in this industry, it was 
difficult to obtain accurate estimates of the effect of the exchange rate on the 
industry. Finally, it is hoped that the theoretical framework developed in this 
paper will provide a good basis on which to extend the model to  consider 
dynamic costs of  adjustment of  quasi-fixed factors.  Such an extension will 
permit a more complete analysis of  the pricing to market phenomenon. 
Appendix 
To  determine the  effect  of  an  exchange rate  change on  the  model,  it  is 
necessary  to  begin  by  totally differentiating equations (13)  and  (14) with 
respect to the exchange rate: 
(A21  dp  1  = -  ay2 + a2Qi  yo)[  aH,(.)  dp,  a~,(.)  aep, dp2] 
de  de  ap,  de  aep,  ap,  de  ’ 
Using the expressions for y, and y2  given by  equations (15) and (16), the 
following results can be obtained: 
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From  the  regularity  properties  of  the  profit  function,  J:(.)  0  and  J: 
(-)  3  0 for i = 1, 2. The third derivative of the profit function with respect 
to an  input  price  can  be  either negative  or positive.  If  the derived input 
demand function is linear in its own price, then the derivative would be zero. 
The usual shape of the demand function is convex to the origin; thus, the third 
derivative would be a small negative number. Hence, B,,  is negative,  while 
B,, and B,,  are most likely positive in sign. 
Equations (3) and (5) can be used to obtain 
Substituting  (A5)-(A8)  in equations (Al) and (A2) and writing  them  in 
matrix form gives 
where C“(-)  is the second derivative of the cost function with respect to output 
and B23 = B,,  - B,,(p,/e).  Using  Cramer’s rule, it is straightforward  to 
show that 
dp,  B23C”(.)eJ’;(.) 
de  IDI 
_-  - 
dP,  _-  + B,, + c”(.)J’;(.il 
- 
de  ID1  (‘41 1) 
where  Dl  is the determinant  of  the  square  matrix  in  (A9), and  it  must be 
positive  for the second-order  conditions  of the monopolist’s  profit  maximi- 
zation problem to  hold. 
Notes 
I. Dunn (1970) and Isard  (1977) represent earlier references in  this area.  More 
recent references include Baldwin  (1988), Feenstra  (1987), Feinberg  (1987), Fisher 
(1987), Froot and Klemperer (1988), Kiyono (1988), and Knetter (1989). 
2.  Owing to the data confidentiality requirements of Statistics Canada, the industry 
being considered cannot be identified. 205  Export Prices and Exchange Rates 
3.  To keep the notation relatively simple, quasi-fixed factors of production, such as 
the capital stock that is employed in estimating the model, are not explicitly included 
in the theoretical specification of the production, profit, and cost functions. 
4.  It  is assumed without explicit justification that price arbitrage between the two 
markets is less than perfect. Typically, transport costs and other transactions costs are 
large enough for most intermediate goods to  prevent effective arbitrage. 
5. While this assumption  may be justifiable  in  the  context  of  a static  short-run 
model such as the one estimated in this paper, it is clearly less reasonable the longer 
the time horizon of  the analysis. 
6. The cost function represents the cost of  manufacturing only. While  transport 
costs are likely to be different in the two markets, the selling prices of the intermediate 
good that are employed in estimation are f.0.b. (freight on board) plant. 
7. Since  the  model  is  static  rather  than  dynamic,  expectations  are  also  static. 
Therefore, any exchange rate change is by  definition unanticipated and also perma- 
nent. 
8. Giovannini (1988) finds with his model that dep,lde  is always positive  if  the 
exchange rate change is expected to persist. 
9.  Diewert (1985) points out that the quadratic function has the disadvantage that 
it is not symmetric in  prices. Therefore, the empirical results will be affected by  the 
choice of  the normalizing price. 
10.  A time  trend  to  capture  technological  change  was  initially  included  as  an 
explanatory variable in the cost function and profit functions. However, it added little 
explanatory power in estimation and was omitted. 
11. This intermediate good is used almost exclusively in the final goods industries. 
It is assumed that the U.S. industry producing the intermediate good behaves like a 
competitive fringe to the Canadian export industry. 
12.  Applebaum (1979) also makes this argument when he uses industry-level data 
for the industry producing the intermediate good. He argues that industry-level data are 
aggregated  over  all  firms.  Therefore,  if  individual  firms  are  setting  prices  above 
marginal cost, then this will also be true in the aggregate. 
13.  For  more  details  on  the  construction  of  firm-level capital  stock  series,  see 
Schembri and Beaulieu (1988). 
14. The  domestic  and  export  prices  are  collected  from  a  survey  of  major 
manufacturers’ selling prices  of  a clearly defined commodity  sold  under the  same 
specified conditions. Therefore, the price data are actual spot prices, not unit values. 
15. There are no tariffs on intermediate good imports to the United States. 
16.  In  the iterated three-stage least squares procedure, all the exogenous variables 
in  the model were used as instruments. 
17.  Since the restrictions across the input demand and markup equations were not 
imposed in  the first step of  the estimation procedure,  it  is  not possible to  obtain a 
consistent estimate of the effect on labor demand. 
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Comment  Alberto Giovannini 
This thorough and interesting paper uses a new data set to estimate pricing 
behavior of internationally trading firms. The main interest of  this work is in 
the unique character of  the data, which  includes  firm-level information  on 
Alberto Giovannini is associate professor at the  Columbia University Graduate School of 
Business. He is a faculty research fellow of  the National Bureau of  Economic Research as well 
as a research fellow of  the Centre for Economic Policy Research. 207  Export Prices and Exchange Rates 
prices and quantities of inputs and outputs. The sixteen firms in this unnamed 
Canadian industry produce an intermediate industrial good  and account for 
90-95  percent  of  the  industry’s total  shipments.  We  also  learn  that  the 
industry exports more than three-quarters of  its output and that its exports 
account for more than 50 percent of U.S. consumption. 
Interest  in  international pricing  behavior  stems from the  work  of  Isard 
(1977), who demonstrated that, even at a very disaggregated level, relative 
prices of domestic and export goods in an industry vary dramatically and are 
sometimes correlated  with  exchange  rates.  These  results,  as  Dornbusch 
(1987) documented, are even stronger when we  look at more recent data, 
including the large swings of the dollar exchange rate since the beginning of 
1980. One particularly striking aspect of the recent experience has been the 
insensitivity of  import prices in the United States to fluctuations of the dollar 
exchange rate. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as lack of  “pass 
through”: a change in the exchange rate, from the firm’s viewpoint and other 
things being equal, represents a shift in demand from the domestic to the 
foreign market. If the foreign currency price of the export adjusts one for one 
with the exchange-rate change, then the shift in demand is not associated with 
any change in relative prices of the two goods, implying a relatively elastic 
supply curve by trading firms. If, on the other hand, exchange rate changes do 
not  affect the  foreign  currency  prices  of  exports  significantly,  then  pass 
through is low, indicating that quantities are unlikely to change in response to 
changes in relative prices. 
The analysis of  the relative movements of  domestic and export prices is 
thus especially valuable to  determine the  elasticity of  export  supplies to 
changes in relative prices and provide invaluable information on the nature of 
the adjustment of  trade imbalances to changes in relative prices.’  Data on 
domestic and export prices of  internationally trading firms are also of  great 
interest to determine the presence of sluggish nominal price adjustment. In the 
presence of slow nominal price adjustments, which would occur, for example, 
when  pricing  decisions are less frequent than  exchange rate  changes,  the 
correlations between the deviations from the law of one price and the nominal 
exchange rate depend in a very clear-cut way on the currency of denomination 
of exports: as is shown in Giovannini (1988a), if exports are denominated in 
foreign currency terms, in the presence of price stickiness deviations from the 
law of one price are highly correlated with the nominal exchange rate because 
the foreign currency price and the domestic currency price do not instanta- 
neously  respond  to  exchange rate  innovations.  On  the  other hand,  when 
export prices are denominated in the same currency as domestic prices, then 
deviations from the law  of  one price should be uncorrelated with exchange 
rate innovations. 
Although international price discrimination cannot really be studied inde- 
pendently  of  the  issue  of  the  frequency of  price  adjustments,  Schembri 
concentrates exclusively on the measurement of the degree to which changes 
in  relative demands give rise to changes in relative prices and changes in 208  Lawrence Schernbri 
quantities. He assumes that producers can perfectly discriminate between the 
domestic  and  the  foreign  market  and  proceeds  estimating  the  relevant 
parameters  of  demand  and cost  functions.  Demand  functions  are obtained 
assuming that the  “downstream”  industries at home and abroad are profit 
maximizers and applying Hotelling’s lemma to the postulated profit functions. 
The whole analysis is carried out assuming that perfect price discrimination 
is possible, that is, that the domestic and foreign markets are perfectly isolated 
from each other. This assumption is questionable.  It is likely that, when the 
U.S. and  the Canadian  markets  are considered,  transactions  costs, even if 
high relative to the unit value of the good in question, should provide a natural 
limitation  to  the  degree  of  price  discrimination  allowed  to  international 
traders.  International  price  discrimination  in  the  presence  of  a  potential 
arbitrage industry  clearly requires a modification  of the model,  including a 
specification of the technology of the incumbent arbitrage industry, which I do 
not want to pursue. Instead, I want to suggest alternative specifications of the 
markup equations.  As  the  author shows, the  current  specification  of  these 
equations appears to perform poorly and might be at the root of the rejection 
of the cross-equation restrictions. 
Schembri applies the same set of first-order conditions to each firm in  the 
data set, implying that a “representative  firm” exists and that the represen- 
tative firm’s efficiency conditions apply to each firm in the set. Since there are 
only sixteen firms in this  industry,  I prefer to take into account the  firms’ 
interactions  explicitly by considering the markup equations in the case of  a 
Cournot-Nash game. For each firm, let f represent the quantities produced by 
the  rest  of  the  firms  in  the  market.  The  demand  equations,  following 
Schembri’s notation, become 
Define the inverse demand equations  and V  as follows: 
(3)  WI  + 6,  WlO,  w1) = P, , 
(4)  V(Y,  + P,,  w~~,  w;) = eP, , 
where l/@, = dH,/dP, and 119,  = dH,/d(eP,). Profit maximization implies 
the two sets of first-order conditions 
(5) 
(6) 
P, - Y,QY - c, = 0, 
P, - YzQy/e - C,  = 0, 
where  subscripts  indicate partial derivatives  with  respect  to  output  and  C 
stands for the cost function. Expressions (5)  and (6) can be directly compared 
with Schembri’s markup equations: 209  Export Prices and Exchange Rates 
(8)  P, + H,(eP,, wto, wMedH2NeP2)1 
+ E,/[ea~,/d(e~,)]  = C, . 
These  equations  are  formally  identical  to  Schembri’s markup  equations, 
except for the  two  terms  representing,  for each  firm,  the  level  of  output 
supplied by the rest of  the market. If firms in this industry are Cournot-Nash 
oligopolists, the  equations estimated by  Schembri suffer from an  omitted 
variable problem, which, however, could be easily remedied. Equations (7) 
and  (8)  have  the  added  advantage  of  permitting  the  estimation  of  the 
parameters of demand equations directly, through the coefficient of  residual 
output terms  rather than  through  the estimation of  demand equations,  for 
which little data are available. 
One important feature of the alternative specification (7) and (8) is that the 
market price is the same for all firms, an assumption that Schembri is already 
exploiting  since  output  prices  data  are  not  available  for  all  firms.  This 
assumption is acceptable if  intrafirm price differences are just the result of 
sampling error and contain no information about firms’ policies. 
If  intrafirm price differences were systematically related to demand and 
supply  determinants,  then  an  alternative model  of  product  differentiation 
would  be  more  plausible.  In  that  case,  information  about  other  firms’ 
quantities would  not  enter markup  equations.  Instead,  other firms’ prices 
would enter the equations as additional explanatory variables in the demand 
functions that each firm faces. These prices would be included in the cost 
functions of firms in the downstream industry, with coefficients representing 
the degree of substitutability of the differentiated products in the downstream 
industry’s production function. 
Notes 
1.  The  interpretation of  the  results  from  these  partial  equilibrium  pass-through 
equations has often been fallacious.  Partial pass through at the firm  level does not 
imply that, in the aggregate, changes in the nominal exchange rate that originate from 
purely nominal disturbances should not be reflected one to one in changes in nominal 
prices. For a discussion, see Giovannini (1988b). 
2.  For cross-industry evidence on exchange rate pass through, see Feinberg (1986) 
and Feenstra (1987). 
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COInment  Catherine J. Morrison 
My comments will be divided into four sections. First, I will emphasize the 
important contributions that are made in the paper. Then, I will focus, second, 
on some of  the problems I see with the model and its implementation and, 
third, on the interpretation difficulties that result. Finally, I will highlight the 
important implications of  Lawrence Schembri’s analysis. 
Important Contributions 
The questions that Schembri is considering are very interesting, and the 
general approach that he uses to address these issues is up to the task. The 
model is related to research that I am currently working on, so I both agree 
with his focus and commiserate with him about the difficulties in interpreta- 
tion and implementation of such a model. 
In particular, I believe that the structural approach to modeling the industry 
using  production  theory  provides  important  and  theoretically  consistent 
implications about the full range of  firm behavior and what it responds to. 
Depending on which characteristics of  an  industry  are important,  various 
types of  firm decision variables can be incorporated and their effects on firm 
behavior explored through construction of  performance indicators and elas- 
ticities. These types of  models have had wide use in the production theory 
literature by researchers such as Elie Appelbaum, Me1  Fuss, Ernst Berndt, 
Erwin  Diewert,  Robert Pindyck,  Julio Rotemberg,  myself,  and  a host  of 
others. Related work along these lines in the macro area follows the lead of 
Robert Hall and, with a more industrial organization focus, includes Domi- 
witz, Hubbard and Peterson, and Timothy Bresnahan. 
The major indicator of interest in the current study is the index of price over 
marginal cost, or the markup indicator. The elasticities that are important are 
primarily exchange rate elasticities, although others clearly could be com- 
puted. Given the full structural model, a large number of  interrelated firm 
responses, both for the export industry and the consuming industries, can be 
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modeled. This is critical for consideration of  important questions such as the 
effect of fluctuating exchange rates; what mechanisms cause us not to observe 
a direct proportional adjustment such as one would expect from a rescaling of 
prices?  The  ability  to  “explain”  occurrences  using  this  model  is  the 
advantage of  Schembri’s approach over the nonparametric or nonstructural 
time-series types of models. I should also note that there could also be other 
characteristics of a particular industry such as inventory holding, advertising, 
and monopsonistic effects that could potentially be incorporated into this type 
of framework and could be illuminating. 
Schembri incorporates exchange rate  responses into the  basic  structural 
production theory model and appends demand equations for the output of the 
“monopolistic”  firm  explicitly  structured as  input  demand  equations  for 
domestic and “foreign”  (U.S.) firms. This is a more complete consideration 
of differing market power across markets than I have seen in such a structural 
model; it provides much potential for interpretation. Note, however, that just 
including the existence of markups adds an extra dimension to the adjustments 
that a firm can make to cushion the effects of exogenous changes. This would 
allow some assessment of how changes in the exchange rate may fail to act 
like a pure price scale effect for the importing industry even in the absence of 
explicit modeling of  exchange rate behavior. 
On the empirical side, the data set appears to be excellent for looking at the 
questions posed. The data are at an establishment level aggregated to the firm, 
in an industry that is relatively homogeneous with a small number of  firms, 
that produces “almost exclusively” for Canadian and U.S. consumption, and 
that exports much  of  its output. The advantages of  this data set will help 
interpretation significantly once justifiable results are developed. 
The frustration that arises from the data is that it is hard to analyze the 
results when one does not know which industry we are talking about. This 
may  not  be  a  solvable problem,  although, elaborating as far  as Statistics 
Canada will possibly allow, to mention, for example, whether this is a durable 
good industry or, perhaps, a natural resource industry would help. 
What Are Some of the Problems? 
Although I like the focus of  the paper, serious difficulties-most  of  which 
I sympathize with-arise  in implementation of  the model. One of  the most 
important theoretically may  be  the  problem of  interpreting results from a 
“monopoly”  framework when the industry of interest is an oligopoly and it 
is therefore unlikely that marginal revenue (MR) and marginal costs (MC) are 
equated in the aggregate. The problem is whether anything effective can be 
done about this. Aggregation conditions are difficult to deal with explicitly, 
although they could possibly be used to rationalize a “representative firm” 
type of approach. Another way to go would be to assume some kind of tacit 
collusion, depending on whether the particular industry justified this. Alter- 
natively, perhaps some limited type of conjectural variation framework could 
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Overall, however, the use of the theory of the firm to obtain implications 
about the industry is problematic. This is recognized early in the paper when 
it is clarified that, as Elie Appelbaum has stated,  if  the results suggest that 
price (P)  is not equal to marginal cost in the aggregate, we can conclude only 
that each individual firm does not set P  = MC and that therefore some market 
power  exists.  In  the  results  section  of  this  paper,  however,  this  care  is 
discarded and interpretation is conducted as if the industry were monopolistic. 
Similarly, it is difficult rigorously to justify nonconstant returns to scale in the 
(export) industry because aggregation conditions will not be met in general. 
These types of aggregation problems are difficult  to deal with,  but at least 
interpretation  of the results should be carried out with care. 
It might also be useful to consider the implications of the functional forms 
used for the analysis. It has often been noted  that the normalized quadratic 
form  causes  asymmetry  of  the  demand  equations  for  inputs  that  is  not 
invariant  to which input is used  for normalization.  This could be  a serious 
problem, particularly when labor, which is likely relatively  fixed in the short 
run, is used as the normalizing input. The main advantage of the quadratic 
form is the fact that second derivatives are simply parameters. However, since 
this property does not seem to be that important for the current model, other 
functional  forms may be more appropriate.  It should also be noted that the 
labor demand  expression  is  not  estimated  in  this  study,  which  leaves  the 
demand  system  incomplete.  This cannot be  accomplished  in  the  current 
framework,  however,  because  consistent  estimates  of  all  cost  function 
parameters  are  not  generated.  In  addition,  the  demand  functions  for  the 
“monopolistically”  produced good are also part of a system; ignoring the rest 
of the consuming firm’s input demand structure leaves the demand functions 
facing the export industry somewhat incomplete.  I do not think that this is 
worthwhile incorporating  since this may be pursuing  “completeness”  of the 
model a bit too far. However,  it may be worth taking into account.  Finally, 
technological  change is not included as an argument of the function. 
Other difficulties arise when the analysis is suddenly expressed in terms of 
short-run  functions at the  point where functional  forms  are specified.  It  is 
stated that this shift does not significantly affect the results derived from the 
theoretical model very much, which is true. However, specification originally 
in terms of  the short-run analysis would be desirable to make the empirical 
analysis more directly applicable to the model development.  Also, construct- 
ing  a  short-run  instead  of  long-run  model  as  a  basis  for analysis  implies 
additional  questions about interpretation.  For example, are we interested in 
short-run or long-run markups? Also, is it possible to develop a representation 
of the  long run in this  framework  since capital in  all industries considered 
must adjust to a steady state and the interactions to this “general equilibrium” 
may be difficult to tie down? It is important to address these issues. 
Another  problem  is one of  omission  rather  than  commission. Schembri 
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tions that  has  been  outlined by  Krugman  and  Giovannini,  and  yet  these 
characteristics are  not  included in  either  the  theoretical  or the  empirical 
model. The current study is a good first cut to look at the questions identified, 
but,  if  these  behavioral  characteristics are  so  important,  they  should  be 
included for the results to make sense. Exchange rate “surprises”  in terms of 
exogenous shocks and responses are capable of being modeled in the current 
framework, but, since only static optimization is incorporated, the pattern of 
responses over time is  ignored.  At  the  very  least,  the focus on  dynamic 
adjustment and expectations should be reduced in the introduction, and the 
emphasis should be on what contributions are made with the static model in 
the paper. A related but less critical problem is that the second half of  the 
‘‘complete  explanation” of “pricing to market” phenomenon discussed in the 
introduction, the ability to set different prices across markets, does not receive 
much consideration or support in the interpretation of the empirical results. 
Difficulties in Interpretation 
This brings me to another dilemma; because of problems with the model 
and its implementation, interpretation of the results and providing justifiable 
conclusions become tricky at best. 
The first dilemma is that the results are based on a very short data series, 
only thirteen years. However, the (perhaps related) problems with conver- 
gence that stimulated Schembri to estimate the model both in two parts and 
with  not all symmetry conditions imposed raise even more questions. The 
problem is that the results for the second part differ substantially from those 
of  the  first part;  the  first  coefficient I checked,  for  example,  dpJdpp, is 
estimated as .473 in the first part and .278 in the second. Although this is less 
of  a difference than in previous versions of  the paper,  if  these results are 
merged to  make any  implications, which they  are for construction of  the 
exchange rate elasticities, the results are seriously suspect. The rejection of 
symmetry conditions is also a problem because, when they are not imposed, 
the interpretation of  the results is ambiguous; the integrated model breaks 
down, and aggregation conditions, for example, no longer stand. 
At the very least, the effect of these inconsistencies should be clarified. It 
may be possible to determine, for example, how different the results would be 
if all the parameter estimates from the second stage were used rather than just 
appending the additional parameter estimates to the original set of estimates 
or if the “symmetry-imposed”  estimates of parameters such as uYE  (or those 
from the other equation) were used.  These tests would be crude, but they 
would provide some indication of sensitivity. Alternatively, and more ideally 
of course, some method of joint optimization should be pursued. 
An  additional  interpretational  difficulty  arises  with  the  exchange  rate 
elasticities because  there  is  so  much  endogeneity  in  the  model  that  the 
elasticity computations may be suspect. I assume the reason pI  is affected by 
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changes cause production to change, which, in turn, affects marginal cost. 
This mechanism is outlined to some extent in the Appendix, which  is the 
computation that  appears to  motivate the  elasticity calculation and is  also 
discussed a bit earlier in the paper. It would, however, be useful to have the 
intuition  of  the elasticity construction spelled out  more  because it  is  not 
completely clear what is being held fixed as all the adjustments are made. 
This uncertainty about the measurement of  the  elasticities is  a  serious 
problem  for interpretation of  the results.  The  implied  output change,  for 
example, is so small compared to the price change, especially in the light of 
the large effect that seems to come from the markup-it  appears to attenuate 
85 percent of  the expected response of  the U.S. price to an exchange rate 
change. I cannot see why this large effect should be directly counteracted by 
an opposite change in the Canadian market. It also seems that input demand 
increases with an exchange rate change even though output decreases. If  I am 
interpreting this correctly, I think  that there are some problems here  with 
consistency, 
An  additional relatively minor interpretation problem arises from recent 
treatments of  the  purchasing  power  parity  literature by  Me1  Fuss  and his 
colleagues at the University of Toronto, who have worked extensively on how 
to adjust prices when comparing industries in different countries. They find, 
I believe, that we should not expect purchasing power parity to hold, which 
could be important for interpretation of the current results. 
Theoretical and Policy Implications and Conclusions 
The model and results from Schembri’s study are potentially very useful. In 
terms of  the production theory  framework, the model of  an  industry with 
market power producing for another industry, and the potential discriminating 
monopolist stories that can be assessed in this framework are intriguing. In 
terms of the international ramifications, I do not know of any other treatment 
of  exchange rate fluctuations that allows alternative decisions of  firms to be 
explicitly characterized in a structural model. The potential insights about the 
deviations of exchange rate effects from those that would be expected from a 
strict purchasing power parity focus are fascinating and wide ranging. Since 
dramatic changes in exchange rates between such countries as Japan and the 
United States have resulted in significantly smaller changes in U.S. prices, 
and since this in turn has muted the effects of exchange rate changes on the 
balance  of  ‘trade that  would  be  expected,  this  type  of  explanation  is 
provocative. 
The  model  also  provides  a  first  cut  at  even  more  elaborate  models, 
including dynamic effects and other characteristics of  firms in a particular 
industry that may provide buffers to macro adjustments. I think that this is an 
important  line  of  research.  An  extension  to  dynamic  analysis  will  be 
particularly important for interpretation of  the results. I am doing a study 
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is particularly important and that including fixity of labor also has a significant 
effect, particularly if nonconstant returns to scale is incorporated. Ultimately, 
constructing a justifiable model of the expectations process will also provide 
important insights. Including these extensions allows one more carefully to 
interpret the indexes and elasticities and to facilitate more complete model 
specification. This Page Intentionally Left Blank